Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement – A Comparison of Swedish and American Law by Summers, Clyde W.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 
VOLUME 72 JANUARY 1963 NUMBER 3 
COLLECTIVE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE 
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT-A COMPARISON OF 
SWEDISH AND AMERICAN LAW 
CLYDE W.SUMMERSt 
ONE of the central problems inherent in collective bargaining is defining the 
relative rights of the individual and the organizations in fixing and enforcing 
the terms and conditions of employment. Both Sweden and the United States 
have confronted this problem in its most insistent form, for in both countries 
government relies upon free collective bargaining as an instrument for regulat- 
ing the labor market. Both countries by statute protect the right to organize 
and bargain collectively; both require recognition of unions and compel nego- 
tiations; and both make collective agreements legally enforceable. This public 
reliance on collective bargaining and legal protection of its processes imposes 
on the law a pressing obligation to define the status of the individual under the 
collective agreement. 
Both countries have rejected the simple solution of giving the organization 
total dominance and wholly submerging the individual. Deeply rooted beliefs 
in the importance of the individual, and the desire to preserve for him some 
measure of independence have compelled the law to confront the difficult prob- 
lem of accommodating the rights of the individual and the rights of the collec- 
tive parties. The efforts in the two countries to resolve this problem provide 
interesting parallels and contrasts which illuminate the problem and suggest 
the range of possible solutions. 
In the United States, the dominant pattern of collective bargaining, and the 
stereotype on which the law is built, is bargaining between a union and a single 
employer.' The problem of individual rights is therefore conceived solely in 
tProfessor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1. Four-fifths of all agreements cover workers in a single company. CHAMBERLAIN, 
LABOR 161 (1958). The National Labor Relations Act makes no explicit provision for mul- 
tiple-employer units, but states that the unit appropriate shall be "the employer unit, craft 
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." Section 9(b), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
? 159(b) (1959). Doubts as to the National Labor Relations Board's power to certify 
multiple-employer units existed until 1957. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, AFL, 353 
U.S. 87, 93-96 (1957). However, multiple-employer bargaining is more prevalent than the 
stereotype suggests. Nearly 40% of all workers covered by collective agreements are in 
multiple-employer systems. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE PUBLIC IN- 
TEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 131 (1961). Multiple-employer bargaining is particular- 
ly dominant in the Clothing, Construction, Coal Mining, Hotel, and Transportation indus- 
tries. CHAMBERLAIN, op. cit. supra at 162. 
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terms of the employee-union relation. In contrast, the dominant pattern of bar- 
gaining in Sweden is collective on both sides, with employers typically repre- 
sented by national employers associations organized along industrial lines.2 A 
single association may bargain for hundreds, if not thousands of employers, 
many of whom are individual entrepreneurs with less than a dozen employees.3 
The law, reflecting this bargaining structure, treats unions and employers asso- 
ciations as full equivalents. Both are protected in their right to organize by a 
statutory provision guaranteeing the "right of association"; and the binding 
effect of collective agreements is defined in terms of the obligations of "associa- 
tions" and "members of associations." As a result, the problem of individual 
rights is more broadly conceived, and the legal rules governing the status of the 
individual under the collective agreement are equally applicable to employers 
and employees. 
In defining the relative rights of the individual and the organization, it is 
essential to distinguish between the making of a collective agreement and its 
administration. The first consists of establishing the rules governing the terms 
and conditions of employment, and the second consists of interpreting and ap- 
plying those rules. Although these two aspects of the bargaining process can 
not be neatly separated, they represent two essentially different functions. The 
law of both countries has recognized this distinction; the power of the union 
to make an agreement binding the individual, and its power to settle an in- 
dividual's claim arising under an agreement are not the same. It is therefore 
necessary to examine separately the status of the individual in these two aspects 
of the bargaining process. 
I. COLLECTIVE POWER IN THE MAKING OF THE AGREEMENT 
Defining the power of the organization to make a collective agreement bind- 
ing on an individual presents two questions-first, who is governed by the col- 
lective agreement; and second, what freedom does the individual who is gov- 
erned retain to contract on his own behalf. Any meaningful comparison of the 
status of the individual in two countries requires not only an analysis of the 
answers which the law in each country has given to these questions, but also an 
2. Approximately 100 employers associations with more than 70,000 employer members 
nearly blanket the Swedish labor market. The dominant organization is the Swedish Em- 
ployers Confederation (Svenska Arbetsgivarefdreningen, or SAF). It is a tightly knit fed- 
eration of 44 employers associations covering most of trade and industry except banking, 
insurance, newspapers, restaurants, retail stores, shipping and agriculture. These have in- 
dependent associations. The pattern is pervasive. The cooperative movement has had its 
own organization for collective bargaining, and various units of municipal, regional and 
national governments bargain through their associations. See SAF, ARBETSGIVAREORGANISA- 
TIONER I SVERIGE (1959). 
3. The Swedish Building Industry Federation has 1,655 employer members with a total 
of 66,108 employees, and the Swedish Workshop Association has 1,341 employer members 
with a total of 236,058 employees. STATISTISKA CENTRALBYRAN, STATISTISK ARSBOK FOR 
SVERIGE 191 (1960). In the Swedish Employers Federation more than half of all the em- 
ployer members have ten or less employees. Id. at 192. 
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inquiry into the actual impact which the collective bargaining system, operating 
within the legal framework, has on the individual in each country. 
Who is Bound by the Collective Agreement 
The basic legal theories in the two countries as to who is bound by the col- 
lective agreement stand in sharp contrast. In the United States the basic theory 
is expressed in Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act,4 which pro- 
vides that the union selected by the majority of the employees in the bargain- 
ing unit shall be the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit. The 
collective agreement negotiated by the majority union binds all employees in 
the unit, members and nonmembers alike. So long as the union retains its 
majority status, the employer is compelled to recognize it as the sole represen- 
tative and is prohibited from bargaining with any other union or any individual 
employee.5 The majority union is thus vested by statute with exclusive author- 
ity to speak for and bind the individual, and his freedom of choice is limited 
to participating in the majority election which determines which is the union. 
In Sweden the basic legal theory, made explicit in the Collective Contracts 
Act,6 is that the union (or employer's association) bargains only for its mem- 
bers and its collective agreement creates rights and duties only for its members.7 
Employees who do not belong to the union stand beyond the bounds of the col- 
lective agreement. If they belong to another union, they are governed by that 
union's collective agreement; if they belong to no union, their rights and duties 
are based on their individual contracts of employment.8 The Swedish theory 
proceeds from the premise that the individual can not be contractually bound 
without his consent. By joining the organization he consents to be bound by 
its collective agreement.9 
Individual consent, however, may be more theoretical than real, for under 
Swedish law the individual may be bound even though he did not consent to 
the particular agreement and is no longer a member. The Collective Contracts 
Act provides that all who are members at any time during the collective agree- 
ment are bound by it until it expires.10 A member who withdraws from mem- 
4. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. ? 159(a). 
5. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 
321 U.S. 678 (1944). See Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. 
REV. 556 (1945). The same rule applies under the Railway Labor Act. Order of Railroad 
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944). 
6. LAG OM KOLLEKTIVAVTAL, SVENSK F6RFATTNINGSSAMLING 253 (1928). 
7. BERGSTR6M, KOLLEKTIVAVTALSLAGEN 70 (1948); ScHMIDT, THE LAW OF LABOUR 
RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 112 (1962). 
8. AD 1946:63; AD 1941 :123. Rights under the collective agreement are enforceable 
in the Labor Court, but rights under contracts of employment not governed by a collective 
agreement are enforceable only in the general courts. 
9. See ADLERCREUTZ, KOLLEKTIVAVTALET 5, Ch. VII (1954); ScHMIDT, TJXNSTEAV- 
TALET 31, 59 (1959). 
10. A collective agreement entered into by an association shall also be binding on 
members of the association in so far as the trades and sectors of industry specified 
in the agreement are concerned, whether such members became members of the as- 
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bership does not thereby cease to be bound by an existing contract. For ex- 
ample, five days after the Textile Workers made a national agreement, a local 
union seceded in protest to the agreement and later struck for better terms. 
However, because the striking employees had been members at the moment 
the contract was made, they continued to be bound and were held individually 
liable in damages for its breach.1" 
To avoid being bound the member must leave the union before the agreement 
becomes effective, but this doorway may not be immediately open, for the right 
to resign may be restricted. Most union constitutions do not permit members 
to resign so long as they continue to work within the union's jurisdiction.12 
Members who are two months in arrears of dues can be expelled and thereby 
escape being bound by subsequent agreements,13 but the expulsion is not auto- 
matic and the union might instead sue for dues. The validity of these union 
rules, whereby the union would obtain irrevocable power, has not been tested 
in the courts, for delinquent members are usually expelled.14 Even so, because 
the individual can escape only by refusing to pay dues, he continues to be bound 
by collective agreements made several months after he has determined to with- 
draw from the union.15 
The Swedish employer is equally bound by agreements made by his associa- 
tion, but his ability to avoid being bound by withdrawing from the association 
is even more restricted. The constitution of the Swedish Employer's Federation, 
for example, provides that resignation is effective only at the end of the calendar 
year in which six months expires after notice of termination.", Thus, an em- 
ployer must give notice before July 1 to withdraw on December 31. Since most 
contracts are negotiated between October and April, the individual employer 
can not escape even though he withdraws 1Jefore negotiation begins. In contrast, 
the American employer who bargains through an association generally retains 
full freedom to withdraw and bargain independently anytime before negotiations 
sociation before or after conclusion of the agreement, unless they are already bound 
by another collective agreement. If a member leaves the association, he shall not 
cease on that account to be bound by the agreement. 
Section 2, cited in SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 243. 
11. AD 1932:33. 
12. The right to withdraw from the union is narrowly restricted to those who have 
transferred to work outside the union's jurisdiction, or who become employers or super- 
visors. A member wishing to withdraw must make application to the local executive board. 
See ? 11, NORMALSTADGAR FOR TILL LANDSORGANISATIONEN I SVERIGE ANSLUTNA FORBUND. 
[Hereinafter cited as NORMALSTADGAR.] 
13. Section 12, NORMALSTADGAR. 
14. There is serious question whether the union, can, by its constitution, bind members 
to future contracts indefinitely. This would contradict the underlying premise that the bind- 
ing effect of the contract is based on the individual's consent. An, individual's agreement 
to give the union such power over his future would probably be unenforceable as violating 
good custom and morals. See BERGSTR6M, op. cit. supra note 7, at 74. 
15. AD 1935:31; AD 1941:16. 
16. CONSTITUTION OF THE SWEDISH EMPLOYERS CONFEDERATION ? 42 (1948). 
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on a new contract are begun,17 and he will not be bound by the contract if he 
withdraws before agreement is reached.18 
The Compulsory Effect of The Collective Agreement 
Although the law of the two countries differs as to who is bound by the col- 
lective agreement, the compulsory effect of the agreement on those who are 
bound is substantially the same. In both countries individual contracts cannot 
subtract from collective ones; the collective agreement controls unless it per- 
mits variations.19 If an employee agrees with his employer to work for less 
than the wage prescribed by the collective agreement, not only is the individual 
contract a nullity, but the employer is liable to the union for breach of contract 
and to the employee for the amount of the underpaymentY An individual con- 
tract for better terms than those in the collective agreement is equally void and 
constitutes a breach of the collective agreement,21 although the employer can 
not generally recover the overpayment.22 Significantly, in both countries the 
collective agreement has been likened to a legislative act, imposing compulsory 
terms on the individual employment contract.23 
In practice, the Swedish union member is somewhat more free to make an 
individual contract than is an American employee represented by a majority 
union. In the United States collective agreements almost never permit varia- 
tions of their terms by individual bargaining, but in Sweden provisions permit- 
17. Twentieth Century Press, 107 N.L.R.B. 292 (1953); W.S. Ponton of New Jersey, 
Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 924 (1951). 
18. If the multiple-employer unit meets the strict standards imposed by the NLRB, 
the employer cannot withdraw after negotiations have begun and obtain an election. With- 
drawal may also be an unfair labor practice if it is for the purpose of frustrating all bar- 
gaining. However, the Board has ordered employers to sign the contract only where they 
have attempted to withdraw after agreement was reached. See Cosmopolitan Studios, Inc., 
127 N.L.R.B. 788 (1960); Anderson Lithograph Co., Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 920 (1959). If the 
multi-employer unit is not the statutory unit, then the normal rules of agency would apply 
and the employers association's authority clearly could be revoked any time before the con- 
tract was concluded. 
19. Compare: "[T] he individual contract cannot be effective as a waiver of any benefit 
to which the employee would be otherwise entitled under the trade agreement . . . . We 
cannot except individual contracts generally . . . because some may be more individually 
advantageous," J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944), with "If an agree- 
ment involving conditions divergent from the collective agreement is concluded between 
employers and employees who are bound by the same collective agreement, such agreement 
shall not be valid, except in so far as the divergences may be deemed to be permissible 
under the collective agreement." Section 3, Collective Contracts Act, cited in SCHMIDT, 
op. cit. supra note 7, at 243. See generally BERGSTROM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 75-77; 
GEIJER & SCHMIDT, ARBETSGIVARE OCH FACKF6RENINGSLEDARE I DOMARSATTE Ch. 3 (1958). 
20. Compare Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 
342 (1944), with AD 1932:55 (employee acknowledged full payment). 
21. AD 1933:185; AD 1944:82. 
22. AD 1930:64; AD 1938:16. 
23. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944); see 
Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 829 
(1948), and BERGSTROM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 76; SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 27, 29. 
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ting such variations, though not common, are not unusual and a number of 
collective agreements permit payment of higher wages, individually bargained, 
to more efficient or senior employees.24 However, this fragment of freedom for 
individual contracts is small and is constricted by the Labor Court's reluctance 
to find that the collective parties have intended to permit individual variances.25 
More important in giving the Swedish worker some measure of contractual 
freedom is that most collective agreements contain no seniority provisions. This 
means that lay-offs, recall, promotions, and other matters which in the United 
States are regulated by seniority rules of the collective agreement, are left large- 
ly to individual bargaining. In the white collar unions the individual may have 
much greater freedom. The collective agreement normally regulates such mat- 
ters as vacation, sick pay, overtime, and notice of termination, but it usually 
does not fix the basic salary. This is established on an individual basis, and 
though the union negotiates on behalf of its various members, any individual 
is free to bargain for his own salary.26 
In one respect the Swedish worker is more tightly bound by the collective 
agreement than his American counterpart, for he is legally liable for his con- 
duct which violates the collective agreement. The Collective Contracts Act im- 
poses a statutory peace obligation on both the contracting organization and 
their individual members for the term of the agreement.27 Any union member 
participating in a wildcat strike can be held personally liable in damages up to 
200 crowns ($40) ,28 and this is regularly enforced. In the 1954 harbor workers 
strike, some 3,500 individual workers were ordered to pay damages totalling 
24. SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 308; see for example, Collective Agreemtent 
Between Swedish Metal Trades Employers Association and the Respective Trade Unions, 
4 April 1960, cited in SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 305, 308. 
25. An agreement by employees to take 10% of their wages in, the form of shares in 
the employer's business was held invalid. AD 1939:54. Similarly acceptance of a fixed salary 
instead of piece rates as prescribed by the collective agreement was prohibited even though 
the fixed salary was more advantageous for the employees. AD 1936:69. Although the 
variance was agreed to by a union representative under circumstances which led the em- 
ployer to believe he had authority, the variance was still a nullity until it was agreed upon 
by the collective parties. AD 1933 :122. Even if the collective contract provides that vari- 
ances can be made on agreement by the collective parties, there must be an unequivocal 
showing of assent, and that assent probably must be evidenced by a written contract. AD 
1956:27. See generally SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 114; Schmidt, Kollektiv Arbets- 
rdtt 1949-1957, Sv. J.T. 209, 219-22 (1958). 
26. This freedom has limited value, for the union normally negotiates salaries for most 
employees. This establishes a pattern which the employer will be reluctant to break. How- 
ever, the individual may be able to persuade the employer that relative to the others he is 
underpaid, and can threaten to quit if his special worth is not recognized. A highly trained 
technical or professional employee who is specially competent may have substantial bar- 
gaining power as an individual. 
27. Section 4, cited in SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 243-44. This statutory obliga- 
tion cannot be waived or limited by provisions in, the collective agreement, but the agree- 
ment may impose obligations more far-reaching. 
28. Section 8, cited in SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 245. The collective parties can, 
by their agreement, impose a liability in excess of 200 crowns. AD 1953 :23; AD 1947:66. 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 14 Mar 2013 09:04:18 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1963] COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 427 
more than a half million crowns.29 In the United States an individual employee 
normally can not be sued for striking in breach of the collective agreement.30 
However, he makes himself liable to discharge and loss of seniority, a penalty 
which may be far more severe than monetary damages.3' In practice this penalty 
is seldom enforced except on leaders of the walk-out. Collective agreements in 
Sweden commonly impose affirmative obligations on employees. For example, 
both the employer and employee are required to give notice of termination, and 
if an employee quits without giving the required notice he may be liable in 
damages for the amount he would have earned during the notice period.32 In 
contrast, the American worker, though protected against unjustified discharge, 
is free to quit at any time and generally has no legal liability under the collec- 
tive agreement. 
The Impact of the Collective Agreement On Those Not Legally Bound 
The basic difference in the legal theories of the two countries is that in Sweden 
the collective agreement does not bind employees who are not members of the 
union. This contrast in theories, however, reverses reality, for in Sweden the 
collective agreement in fact governs members and non-members alike, and 
reaches much further than agreements in the United States. 
The individual worker has relatively little bargaining power, even under 
Swedish conditions of full employment, and the employer is under strong pres- 
sures to apply uniform terms to all of his employees regardless of union mem- 
bership. Variances create administrative difficulties, breed dissension in the work 
force, and invite opposition by the union which has its own compelling reasons 
to insist on uniformity of treatment. These pressures for uniformity are rein- 
forced by legal rules and extended by the Swedish structure of collective bar- 
gaining. 
29. See AD 1954:18 and AD 1954:39-50. 
30. Section 301(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides: "Any money 
judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be 
enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not 
be enforceable against any individual member or his assets." 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 27 U.S.C. 
? 185(b) (1959). The Supreme Court has declared that these words should not be given 
a "niggardly reading," and dismissed a suit for damages brought against individuals who 
participated in a strike which violated the union's obligation under the no-strike clause. 
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249 (1962). The Court, however, reserved 
the question whether employees might be individually liable for engaging in a wildcat strike 
not authorized by the union and therefore not a violation of the union's obligation. Id. at 
249 n.7. It would seem however, that an action against the members in tort would be pre- 
empted. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and that an 
action on contract could be maintained only if there were found an intent by the parties 
to impose such a liability on the individual employees. This is not normally contemplated, 
for the parties usually view the no-strike clause as imposing financial liability only on the 
union and employer. 
31. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939). Section 8(d) of the LMRA 
specifically authorizes an employer to discharge employees who strike during the contract 
term. But cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). 
32. See, e.g., AD 1947:66. 
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The collective agreement often expressly provides that the employer shall 
apply its terms to all employees, regardless of union membership. Although 
this does not legally bind the non-union worker, and he is theoretically free to 
bargain for different terms, the employer would thereby become liable to the 
union for breach of contract.33 Even without an express provision, the collec- 
tive agreement creates an implied obligation on the employer not to apply lesser 
terms to non-union employees.34 If he gives them better terms than those in 
the collective agreement, he holds himself open to a charge of violating the 
right to organized5 
Although the individual non-union employee is- not bound by the collective 
agreement, its norms are imposed on his individual contract of employment in 
the guise of custom unless he and the employer expressly agree otherwise.36 
In one case a member of one union objected because money had been deducted 
from his earnings and paid over to a rival union for its services in computing 
earnings under complex piece rates. The employer knew that the employee 
neither wanted nor used this service but had the computation made by his own 
union. However, the court held that the employee had impliedly agreed that his 
employment conditions should be regulated in accordance with the collective 
agreement of the rival union under which the deductions were made. No ex- 
press exception had been made in the individual's contract of employment 37- 
nor could the employer realistically agree to one in defiance of the rival union. 
The individual thus "consented" to support the rival union. The end result of 
both the industrial practice and the judicial decisions in Sweden is that the in- 
dividual contract follows the collective contract; the terms of the collective 
agreement are in fact imposed on non-members. 
Workers who seek to bargain through a separate union fare little better. The 
employer is even more unwilling to have a second collective agreement which 
departs from the terms of the dominant union's agreement; and the dominant 
union finds collective deviations even more intolerable than individual ones. 
Thus the Syndicalist unions, a small competing group, have had little choice 
but to accept collective agreements with terms identical to those already nego- 
tiated by unions in the dominant Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions 
(LO).38 
33. SCHMIDT, TJXNSTEAVTALET 41 (1959). 
34. AD 1931 :93; AD 1932:95. This obligation is implied unless the contract clearly 
provides otherwise, AD 1943 :96; AD 1957:26. It applies not only to none-union employees 
but to members of another union covered by another collective agreement with less advanw- 
tageous terms, AD 1952:8; AD 1944:37. 
35. AD 1936:78; AD 1947:72; AD 1948:52. 
36. This is true even' though the employer has no collective agreement, for the court 
will follow custom and usage in the industry, and in, determining that will look to collective 
agreements of other employers. SCHMIDT, TJXNSTEAVTALET 59-68 (1959). 
37. N.J.A. 1948 s. 1. 
38. The Syndicalists have a total membership of 17,000. SAC's Verksamhetsberattelse, 
1959, p.e. The Swedish Confederation of Trade Unionis has a membership of 1,467,117. 
LANDSORGANISATIONEN'S BERXTTELSE 3 (1959). The Syndicalists are the only significant 
labor organization competing with the Confederation,. 
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The subservience of separatist groups is dramatically demonstrated in a case 
involving a group of forest workers in western Sweden who, because of dis- 
satisfaction with their representation by the national union, seceded and formed 
their own union. Although they negotiated separately with the employers asso- 
ciation, the agreements followed the wording of the agreement with the national 
union. In 1955, the employers first negotiated with the national union, obtain- 
ing changes in various provisions. Then, in bargaining with the separate union, 
the employers insisted that a contract with different terms could not be con- 
sidered. The state mediator proposed a contract of identical wording and this 
was finally accepted. Later a dispute arose as to sick pay under this contract. 
In the Labor Court the employers association argued that in negotiations with 
the national union it had been clearly understood that employees were not en- 
titled to the claimed sick pay. The separate union declared that it knew nothing 
of this understanding and could not be bound by it. The employers, however, 
argued that they had insisted on identical contracts to avoid different terms for 
members of different unions and the separate union must be considered as im- 
pliedly agreeing to interpretations applicable to the national union. The national 
union submitted an affidavit accepting the employers' interpretation. The Labor 
Court, after observing that the parties to the national agreement were in accord 
as to its meaning, found that this interpretation was required by its wording.39 
Such cases make clear that although each union is legally free to negotiate 
separately, the dominant union is in fact the sole bargaining agent. 
The impact of the dominant union's agreement is even more far-reaching 
than this portrays. Collective bargaining in Sweden is highly centralized, with 
national agreements made between national organizations along industry lines 
forming the prevailing pattern. The Swedish Employers Confederation (SAF) 
and other employers associations have sought to deal with national unions in 
each industry and to make a single agreement applicable throughout the indus- 
try.40 They have succeeded in imposing this pattern and have effectively pre- 
vented employer members from making varying contracts with other unions.41 
As a result, the union recognized by the employer association as dominant in 
the industry becomes in fact the sole bargaining agent for all employees of the 
association's members; its collective agreement regulates the terms and con- 
ditions of employment throughout the association. The unions which hold this 
power undoubtedly have as members a majority of employees in fact governed 
by their agreements. The effect, however, is to make the bargaining unit in- 
dustry-wide and to leave employees in smaller units little freedom to choose 
separate representatives or to engage in individual bargaining. 
39. AD 1944:60. 
40. Although not ajl employers associations belong to SAF, see note 2 supra, there 
is no substantial competition between the associations for membership. With minor excep- 
tions, each association, dominates its industry. 
41. The Constitution of SAF requires that all collective agreements made by a mem- 
ber employer be approved by the Board of SAF. CONSTITUTION OF THE SWEDISH EMPLOYERS 
CONFEDERATION ? 35 (1948). 
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In contrast, the bargaining unit for which the American union is exclusive 
representative is typically much smaller. The National Labor Relations Board 
rarely certifies an industry-wide unit, and only under special conditions estab- 
lishes multiple-employer units.42 The typical bargaining unit consists of the 
employees of a single employer, but the unit may be even smaller, for the Board 
frequently permits employees in different plants of the same employer or even 
different craft or occupational groups in the same plant to choose different bar- 
gaining representatives.43 Furthermore, the union's statutory power to repre- 
sent is limited to bargaining units in which it has a majority. If the union and 
the employer negotiate an agreement regulating the terms and conditions of 
employment of employees outside the bargaining unit, both are guilty of an 
unfair labor practice.44 It is true that collective agreements often cover a large 
number of bargaining units, and bargaining in practice may be industry-wide.45 
However, each legal bargaining unit retains a substantial measure of freedom 
to act independently. It is also true that a collective agreement may have radia- 
tions on employees beyond those directly governed, and certain key contracts 
may establish patterns for whole industries.46 The pattern, however, is not rigid 
and generally does no more than fix the level of economic benefits. There still 
remains substantial flexibility in determining how those benefits will be dis- 
tributed and in adjusting non-economic terms of the collective agreement. 
The end result is that although the basic legal theory in Sweden makes the 
collective agreement binding only on the union member, the legal rules and col- 
42. The Board has frequently declared that a single-employer unit is presumptively 
appropriate and that to establish a broader unit there must be a history of bargaining on a 
multiple-employer basis. There must be an unequivocal showing of a desire by the individual 
employer to be bound in future collective bargaining by the group. E.g., Morgan Linen 
Service, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 420 (1961); Shreveport-Bossier Cleaners & Laundries, Inc., 
124 N.L.R.B. 534 (1959). The employer may escape the multiple-employer unit by a timely 
withdrawal which shows an intent to pursue a course of independent bargaining. Jones & 
Anderson Logging Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1955) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Works Co., 93 N.L. 
R.B. 1414 (1951). See generally Jones, The NLRB and the Multiple Employer Unit, 5 
LAB. L.J. 34 (1954). 
43. The NLRB publishes no statistics on the types of bargaining units certified. How- 
ever, the general rules followed by the Board in allowing different groups of employees of 
the same employer separate representation are indicated in the annual reports. See, e.g., 
TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NLRB 54-57, 64-67 (1961). The individual's 
freedom of choice is further enlarged by the Board's use of the employees' own' desires as 
one of the tests in determining the size of the appropriate unit. See Note, 6 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 673 (1939). Such self-determination or "globe" elections are made mandatory by stat- 
ute for professional employees. See Section 9(b), Labor Management Relations Act, 61 
Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. ? 159(b) (1958). 
44. Cf. Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957); 
Local 164, Brotherhood of Painters, 126 N.L.R.B. 997 (1960). 
45. PIERSON, MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING (1948); BACKMAN, MULTI-EMPLOYER 
BARGAINING (1951); FEINSINGER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY 
(1949) . 
46. See Seltzer, Pattern Bargaining and the United Steelworkers, 59 J. POL. ECON. 322 
(1951); MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE IN THE RUBBER INDUSTRY, CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRY- 
WIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1-7 (1949). 
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lective bargaining system in practice give the dominant union in the industry 
sole bargaining rights for the industry. Although the basic legal theory in the 
United States gives the majority union sole bargaining rights, the fragmented 
nature of bargaining units provides much greater flexibility and gives the em- 
ployee a greater measure of freedom of choice. 
The Swedish employer who does not belong to an employers association often 
stands in little better position than the unorganized worker. After a union 
negotiates a national agreement with the association, it then approaches the 
unorganized employer and insists that he accept the same terms, or perhaps 
even a little better "to make up for what he saves by not joining the associa- 
tion." In the construction industry the employer is simply presented a short 
printed form to sign which incorporates by reference the terms of the national 
agreement. In some cases the contract binds the individual employer in advance 
to changes or interpretations agreed upon by the union and the association. The 
individual employer is no match for the national union and has no choice but 
to be governed by the employers associations contract. This same pattern ap- 
pears in the United States in unionized industries made up predominantly of 
small employers, such as trucking, construction, garment and printing. The 
significant difference is that in Sweden, because unions and employers associa- 
tions so blanket the labor market, the pattern is far more pervasive. There is 
little real independence for either workers or employers who remain outside the 
organizations which dominate the labor market. 
The Union's Duty to The Individual 
The power of the union to represent employees and to make collective agree- 
ments binding on the individual carries with it certain obligations to the in- 
dividual. The roots of this duty were laid bare by the United States Supreme 
Court in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.47 In that case the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen had negotiated a collective agreement 
which placed all Negro employees at the bottom of the seniority list and had 
the effect of ultimately eliminating them from firemen's jobs. The Court, in 
holding this agreement unlawful, declared: 
Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers 
comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and re- 
strict the rights of those whom it represents, . . . but it has also imposed 
on the representative a corresponding duty . . . to exercise fairly the power 
conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile 
discrimination against them.48 
The source of the union's duty of fair representation is its statutory power 
to bargain and make binding collective agreements. Emphasis in this case was 
placed on the statutory source of the majority union's power to represent non- 
members-here, Negroes who were denied admittance to the union. But the 
Court also drew on broader concepts of an agent's duty to his principal, for it 
said: 
47. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
48. Id. at 202-03. 
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It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power 
to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty 
to exercise that power in their behalf.49 
In Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union,50 the emphasis shifted. The union had 
negotiated seniority provisions which served to keep Negroes, who were union 
members, in menial jobs. The union argued that the Negroes, by joining the 
union, had consented to its representing them. Therefore, the union's authority 
to represent did not rest on the statute and the union was not subject to any 
statutory duty to represent fairly.51 This argument was curtly rejected. The 
collective agreement was "the product not merely of private agreement, but also 
of the provisions of the law,"52 and the law imposed on the union the duty to 
represent fairly all employees, union or non-union alike. 
The union's duty extends even beyond those for whom it bargains. In 
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard,53 the all-white Trainmen negotiated 
an agreement requiring the employer to give employees it represented jobs pre- 
viously held by Negroes who were represented by another union. The Train- 
men argued that since the Negroes were in another bargaining unit it owed no 
duty to them. The Supreme Court, however, held that this was "an unlawful 
use of power granted by a federal act." The duty was stated in broad terms- 
"Bargaining agents who enjoy the advantages of the Railway Labor Act's pro- 
visions must execute their trust without lawless invasions of the rights of other 
workers."54 The source of the union's duty to the individual is not its statutory 
right to represent him but its statutory power to bargain and make binding 
agreements which in fact govern the individual's employment. 
In Sweden the union's duty to individual employees in bargaining remains 
undeveloped. Only one case raising the question has been found, a case in which 
a white collar worker sued his union for failure to exert itself on his behalf. 
Although the court assumed that the union owed a duty to use reasonable 
efforts, it found that the union had done all that could be expected and dismissed 
the suit.55 Legal scholars, however, have argued that according to general legal 
principles the union "must treat all members alike" ;56 that the union must not 
"discriminate" in the sense that "one or more members' interest in an unreason- 
able degree is neglected in relation to others."57 The source of this duty has not 
been clearly defined. In part it is based on implied terms in the union's con- 
stitution, and in part on the general duty of an association to its members. But 
49. Id. at 202. 
50. 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955), reed mem., 350 U.S. 892 (1955). 
51. Showing of a statutory duty, as contrasted with a common law duty, was essential 
to give the federal court jurisdiction, as there was no diversity of citizenship. Ibid. 
52. Id. at 745 (dissenting opinion,). 
53. 343 U.S. 768 (1952). 
54. Id. at 774. 
55. Stockholm Radhusrfitt, 10 Jan. 1957; affirmed, Svea Hovritt, 19 Sept. 1958. 
56. SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 90. 
57. BERGSTR6M, op. cit. supra note 7, at 82. 
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the deeper root of the duty is the binding effect which the Collective Contracts 
Act gives to the collective agreement and its curtailment of the individual's 
freedom of contract-an echo of the reasoning in the Steele case. Indeed, the 
union is said to have the "power to 'legislate' through the collective agree- 
ment,"58 and that guidance in marking the limits of the union's power may be 
found in the principles governing legislation.59 
The question has never been discussed in Sweden whether the union in bar- 
gaining is under any duty to non-members. When the collective agreement 
requires the employer to apply certain terms in the individual employment con- 
tracts of non-members, only in the dryest technical sense can it be said that non- 
members are not governed by the collective agreement. The provision is made 
binding by the Collective Contracts Act, and is enforced through the special 
procedures of the Labor Court. Indeed, the Labor Court will itself read such 
a provision into the agreement, effectively curtailing the individual's freedom 
for the purpose of protecting the status of the union and the integrity of the 
collective agreement.60 It would seem, therefore, that the union's duty should 
run also to non-members so subject to its control. It is true that Swedish unions 
do not lean so heavily on the law as American unions to protect their right to 
organize or to define their status as bargaining agents. However, reliance on 
the law to define rights under the collective agreements and make them bind- 
ing is much more deeply rooted in Sweden than in the United States, and the 
union's practical power to regulate terms and conditions of employment is much 
more far reaching. The union's duty to individuals in bargaining might well be 
thought to be substantially the same. 
The doctrine of fair representation has remained undeveloped in Sweden 
primarily because the problem is not posed with such sharpness or frequency. 
Racial discrimination, the breeding ground of the most glaring cases in the 
United States, has never been a serious problem in Swedish unions, nor has 
any other minority been marked for such invidious discrimination.6' Further- 
more, seniority provisions, which are most productive of claims of unfairness 
because they inherently give some employees job priorities over others, are 
relatively uncommon; and Swedish employers have successfully insisted for the 
58. Id. at 73. 
59. Id. at 81. 
60. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text. 
61. Women have been commonly subjected to wage differentials, sometimes being paid 
20 to 30 percent less than men for identical work, the differential even being applied to 
piece rates. No question was ever raised whether this discrimination, written into collective 
agreements, violated the union's duty to treat all members equally. In' 1956, LO adopted 
resolutions to eliminate this differential. See PROTOKOLL, LANDSORGANISATIONENS KON- 
GRESS, Motions 23-24 (1956). However, the differential continued under a policy of grad- 
ualism. In 1960, both LO and SAF opposed adoption of International Labor Organization 
Convention No. 100 on Equal Pay for Women, arguing that the problem should be solved 
by collective bargaining under a five year plan adopted by LO and SAF earlier in the year. 
See FACKF6RENINGSNORELSEN 194, 306, 385 (1960). Ratification was rejected by the Par- 
liament. 
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most part on retaining control over job assignments.62 The system of national 
agreements makes more difficult the designing of general provisions which will 
discriminate against any individual or group. Unfairness, however, is still pos- 
sible, particularly in local negotiation of piece rates, but claims of substantial 
unfairness are extremely rare. 
The protection which the duty of fair representation in fact gives the in- 
dividual in the United States can be easily overestimated, for the standard im- 
posed on the union is vague, if not illusory. The Steele case 63 recognized that 
the union could not be required to treat all employees alike, that the union must 
be able to make variations based on relevant differences even though this had 
unfavorable effects on some employees. But what are "relevant differences"? 
The Court went no further than to declare that "discriminations based on race 
alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious."64 Later cases have neither clari- 
fied nor raised the standard, but only added equally unhelpful adjectives. The 
union must be allowed "a wide range of reasonableness . . . subject always to 
complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."65 
Various writers have formed other phrasings, and sought to identify more 
tangible guides, but the standard remains low and elusive.66 As a result, the 
only cases in which unions have been found to have violated their duty of fair 
representation in negotiating an agreement have been cases of racial discrimi- 
nation. The difficulty is inherent in the problem. The union in bargaining seeks 
a variety of benefits for a wide range of groups whose interests compete or 
conflict. Bargaining is a process of exchange, compromise and surrender of a 
multitude of claims, and the parties are concerned with finding a formula for 
settlement. For the courts to weigh too closely the allocation of the benefits 
among the employees would plunge the courts into a task far beyond their com- 
petence and seriously hinder the parties in reaching an agreement. 
IT. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN ADMINISTERING THE AGREEMENT 
In both Sweden and the United States the courts early established that the 
individual acquired legal rights under the collective agreement. Thus, in 1915 
the Swedish Supreme Court held in the leading Stockholm Printers Case that 
the individual member could sue for damages which he suffered because of a 
breach of his organization's collective agreement.67 A year earlier a New York 
court had held that an employee could sue his employer for the wages due under 
62. The Constitution of SAF provides that every collective agreement entered into by 
a member employer contain a provision, recognizing "the right of the employer to engage 
and dismiss workers at his own discretion; to direct and allot the work; and to avail him- 
self of workers belonging to any organization whatsoever, or to none." Section 35. 
63. Supra note 47. 
64. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944). 
65. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). 
66. See Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 OHIo 
ST. L.J. 39 (1961); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal 
Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958). 
67. N.J.A. 1915, s 233. 
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the collective agreement even though he had agreed to work for less.68 In both 
countries the law also recognized that the union acquired rights under the col- 
lective agreement and that it could sue the employer to enforce not only pro- 
visions protecting its institutional interests such as the union shop, but also 
provisions fixing terms and conditions of employment for individual em- 
ployees.69 
Recognition that both the individual and the union have rights under the 
same provisions of the collective agreement raises difficult questions as to the 
interrelationship of those rights. It is clear that the individual's and the union's 
rights can not be wholly independent of each other and separately enforced. 
This would subject the employer to the burden of double litigation and the risk 
of conflicting results. The rights must be adjudicated in a single proceeding. 
It is also clear that the individual by litigating or settling his claim can not 
control the union's right. This would invite variances and prevent the union 
from protecting the rights of other employees. The critical question is, what 
control does the union have over the individual's rights? If an employee is 
wrongfully discharged, must he process his grievance through the union? And 
if the union refuses to proceed may he then proceed on his own? If a worker 
is not paid according to the collective agreement, can the union by settling with 
the employer for half the amount due destroy his right to the remainder? If an 
individual claims that his lay-off violates the seniority provisions of the collec- 
tive agreement, can the union by accepting the employer's interpretation of the 
provision foreclose him from obtaining an adjudication of his claim? 
These questions as to the relative rights of the individual and the union in 
administering the agreement are raised in substantially similar form in Sweden 
and the United States. However, the progress of the law in resolving them has 
been markedly different. In Sweden these questions were considered as early 
as 1910 in drafting proposed legislation on collective agreements.70 Nothing 
was passed at the time, but in 1928 the Collective Contracts Act 71 was enacted 
defining the rights and duties of both organizations and individuals under col- 
lective contracts. At the same time, the Labor Court was created with juris- 
diction to decide disputes as to the meaning and application of collective agree- 
68. Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N.Y. Supp. 952 (1914). 
69. In both countries legal writers struggled to develop a viable legal theory which 
would fit collective agreements within the framework of traditional contract doctrines. 
The theories proposed were strikingly similar-theories of agency, third party beneficiary, 
and usage. All of these proved clumsy or artificial in rationalizing the legal results which 
were required to meet the practical needs of the collective bargaining relationship. Compare, 
e.g., Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARV. L. REV. 572 (1931); 
and Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 YALE L.J. 195 (1938), with 
UNDEN, KOLLEKTIVAVTALET ENLIGHT GALLiNDE SVENSK RXTT (1912); and ADLERCREUTZ, 
KOLLEKTIVAVTALET Ch. 7 (1954); and BERGSTROM, KOLLEKTIVAVTALSLAGEN Ch. 2 (1948). 
70. See ADLERCREUTZ, op. cit. supra note 69, at 463; KUNGL, MAJ :TS PROPOSITION No. 
96 (1910); AKERMAN & OLIN, PROMEMORIA ANGAENDE LAGSTIFTNING OM ARBETSAFTAL 
(1910). 
71. Note 6 supra. 
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ments.72 The Labor Court Act expressly permitted the individual under cer- 
tain conditions to bring his own case before the court.73 Applying the guides of 
these statutes the Labor Court has developed a substantial body of law defining 
the relative rights of the individual and the organization under the collective 
agreement. In contrast, courts and writers in the United States showed no 
clear awareness of the problem, at least prior to 1945.74 In a large number of 
cases individuals were allowed to sue,75 but apparently in none of these did the 
employer defend on the grounds of prior settlement with the union.76 The 
courts were thus not confronted with the issue.77 However, with the growth of 
contractual provisions for grievance procedures and arbitration toe settle dis- 
putes arising under the contract, employers began to argue that this procedure 
for enforcing the agreement was exclusive and that the union's settlement deter- 
mined both the union's and the individual's rights. This argument was strongly 
endorsed by the unions, for they did not relish having their decisions challenged 
by individuals and their settlements found in violation of the agreement. Con- 
fronted squarely with the problem, the courts have seized upon a variety of 
solutions, and as cases presented different facets of the problem have produced 
a welter of conflicting decisions. The courts have not yet developed any consen- 
sus either as to analysis or underlying policy. 
The lack of a cohesive body of American law makes any meaningful com- 
parison with Swedish law impossible. But this may make study of the Swedish 
experience and the detailed rules it has developed all the more fruitful, for it 
may provide us helpful guides in working out our own solution. To provide 
perspective to this study it is necessary first to sketch briefly some of the solu- 
tions suggested in the United States and the policies on which they seem to 
rest. 
72. LAG OM ARBETSDOMSTOLEN, SVENSK FORFATTNINGSSAMLING 254 (1928). 
73. An association which has concluded a collective agreement may bring an, action in 
the Labour Court on behalf of any person who is or has been a member of the asso- 
ciation; and a member of an association may not himself bring an action unless he 
proves that the association has refused to take action on, his behalf.... 
Section 13 of Act Respecting the Labour Court, cited in SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 
246. 
74. See, e.g., Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope, 
1949 WASH. U.L.Q. 3; Burstein, Enforcement of Collective Agreements by the Courts, 6 
N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 3 (1953); Note, The Ability of an Individual Employee to Sue 
His Employer on a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 3 BUFFALO L. REV. 270 (1954). 
75. See cases cited Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 352 (1951). 
76. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956). 
77. The first clear confrontation with the problem was by the United States Supreme 
Court in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945). The first writings exploring 
the problem were Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 
11 U. PITT. L. REV. 35 (1949); Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of 
Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (1950); Report of the Comnmittee on In- 
provement of Administration of Union Management Agreements, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 143 
(1955); Cox, supra note 76. 
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SOME AMERICAN SOLUTIONS 
Court decisions and writings on individual rights under the collective agree- 
ment present a confusing medley of ideas and conclusions,78 but these may be 
roughly grouped into three basic approaches or theories which lead to distinctly 
different solutions. Each approach has a multitude of variations, but there is 
no need here to delineate these details. It is enough to sketch the three ap- 
proaches and articulate the assumptions on which they are based so as to reveal 
the sources of the conflicting results and the range of possible solutions.79 
1. The Collective Control Approach. The first approach emphasizes the 
power of the collective parties to control terms and conditions of employment, 
and is illustrated by the New York case of Parker v. Borock.80 An employee, 
Parker, who claimed that he had been wrongfully discharged filed, a grievance 
with the union but the union refused to carry his case to arbitration. Parker 
himself then sought arbitration, but the court held that because the collective 
agreement provided only for the union to demand arbitration, an individual had 
no right to compel arbitration.8' He then sued the employer for damages. The 
court held that as a "direct beneficiary" he acquired rights under the provision 
prohibiting discharge without just cause. However, those rights were limited 
by the grievance and arbitration provisions which gave the union exclusive 
power to enforce, and when the union refused to proceed the individual's right 
terminated. The result is that the union controls the individual's right and can 
make a binding settlement without his consent.82 
The collective control approach relies on simple contract logic: the individ- 
ual's rights are based on the collective agreement and are therefore subject to 
the conditions in the agreement. This, however, assumes that the collective 
parties are free to impose whatever conditions they see fit, not only on their 
own rights but also on the rights of individuals governed by their agreement; 
that the power to establish terms and conditions of employment binding on the 
individual includes the power to make the individual's rights depend on the 
union's willingness to assert them. This reasoning vests the union with the same 
plenary power to represent employees in the administration of the agreement 
that it has in the negotiation of the agreement. The individual is bound not only 
by the rules established in the collective agreement, but also by all the day by 
day variances, exceptions, and dispensations of those rules accepted in the 
78. See Blumrosen, Legal Protection For Critical Job Interests Union-Management 
Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 631 (1959); Hanslowe, In 
dividual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL .Q. 25 (1959); Howlett, Con- 
tract Rights of the Individual Employee As Against The Employer, 8 LAB. L.J. 316 (1957). 
79. The various solutions have already been extensively belabored by the author in 
Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362 (1962). 
80. 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959). 
81. United States v. Voges, 124 F. Supp. 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). 
82. For other illustrative cases see Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.W. 
2d 523 (1957); Falsetti v. Local 2026, U.M.W., 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960); Jenkins 
v. Schluderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958); Ostrofsky v. United 
Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (1959). 
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grievance procedure. The individual's rights are wholly subject to the union's 
control. 
Giving the union complete control over the individual's grievances has been 
justified on the claimed practical needs of collective bargaining. Thus it is 
claimed that to allow the individual to assert his claim "would create a condition 
of disorder and instability and would be disastrous to labor as well as indus- 
try."83 Collective bargaining should be a continuous process of adjusting com- 
peting and conflicting interests day by day-"a relationship in which grievances 
are treated as problems to be solved, and contract clauses are only guideposts 
in a dynamic human relationship."84 The settlement of grievances, it is argued, 
is an integral part of the continual process of contract making and in all parts 
of that process the union must have complete control to determine individual 
rights. Advocates of this approach recognize that giving the union untrammelled 
control over grievances creates grave risks to the individual, for settling par- 
ticular grievances offers opportunities for discrimination which do not exist in 
negotiating general rules. They would protect the individual by enforcing the 
union's duty of fair representation.85 However, as the discussion in the preced- 
ing section has suggested, the standard imposed by this duty is extremely vague 
and has provided little protection against discrimination in making the agree- 
ment. It can provide even less protection against discrimination in grievance 
handling where the forms of unfairness are more subtle and the problems of 
proof more difficult. Even the advocates of this test doubt its efficacy to give 
the individual any practical protection. Many courts have declared that unions 
have such a duty in handling grievances, but almost no decisions have held that 
the union has violated that duty.86 
2. The Individual Rights Approach. The second approach to this problem 
emphasizes the right of the individual in his contract of employment, and is 
illustrated by the case of Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood.87 Again, an employee 
who claimed that he had been wrongfully discharged filed a grievance, but the 
union refused to carry the case to arbitration. He then sued the employer who 
sought to dismiss the case on the grounds that the collective agreement provided 
for enforcement only through arbitration. The court rejected this argument and 
held that although the individual must seek to enforce his rights through the 
administrative procedures provided by the agreement, the agreement here gave 
83. Bianculli v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 115 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
84. Cox, supra note 76, at 632. 
85. Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 LAB. L.J. 
850, 854 (1957); Hanslowe, supra note 78, at 46. 
86. That the duty of fair representation is often a dead end is demonstrated by the New 
York cases, see Summers, supra note 79, at 364-66. See also Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 
295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961); Bailer v. Local 470, Int'l Teamsters, 400 Pa. 188, 161 A.2d 
343 (1960). For two exceptional cases where the duty of fair representation was used to 
deprive the union of the power to represent the individual because its interests were adverse 
to those of the individual, see Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 
(1959); Guzzo v. United Steelworkers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2379 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1960). 
87. 266 Ala. 194, 95 So. 2d 98 (1957). 
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him no right to arbitration and he could therefore bring his action in court. 
The unavailability of arbitration did not destroy his right but allowed him to 
enforce it in another forum.88 
The logic of this approach is that the employee has rights under his individual 
contract of employment, and though that contract must conform to the collec- 
tive agreement, the rights are not created by the collective agreement but by 
the individual's accepting employment.89 The rights are therefore vested in the 
individual and can not be divested by the union's refusal to enforce. In con- 
trast to the collective control theory, the individual rights theory assumes that 
the power of the collective parties over the individual is limited-that they can 
not by their agreement impose on the individual's employment contract a pro- 
vision giving the union exclusive control over enforcement. The individual 
rights approach seeks to protect the individual from the dangers of unfairness 
in grievance handling by giving him an independent right. As indicated above, 
it has been criticized as weakening the union's control and destroying the flexi- 
bility needed in the bargaining relationship. 
Although the individual rights approach limits the union's control, it does 
not assert that enforcement of the agreement is totally independent of the union, 
for the courts generally require the individual to exhaust the contract proce- 
dures.90 The union is thereby given first opportunity to enforce and protect its 
interests, and the claim is channelled through the orderly processes for settling 
disputes arising under the agreement. But the union by refusing to proceed and 
blocking the grievance process can not thereby destroy the individual's rights. 
This approach, however, does not give the individual the right to arbitration. 
The logic of contract controls; the employer can be compelled to arbitrate only 
in accordance with his agreement, and an agreement to arbitrate with the union 
will not be read as including arbitration with an individual.9' But if he refuses 
to arbitrate, the individual can enforce his rights in court. 
3. The Statutory Approach.92 The third approach emphasizes the statutory 
status of the union as representative and looks to the provisions of the National 
88. Further illustrative cases are Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 82 
N.W.2d 172 (1957); Marranzano v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 184 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1950); 
Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Raynor, 220 Md. 501, 154 A.2d 814 (1959); In re Norwalk Tire 
& Rubber Co., 100 F. Supp. 706 (D. Conn. 1951); Nichols v. National Tube Co., 122 F. 
Supp. 726 (N.D. Ohio 1954). 
89. Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
90. See Blumrosen, supra note 78, at 642-51; Hanslowe, sutpra note 78, at 36; Com- 
ment, Exhaustion of Remedies Under Collective Bargaining Agreements: A Reappraisal, 
54 Nw. U.L. REV. 605 (1959). 
91. See, e.g., Arsenault v. General Electric Co., 147 Conn. 130, 157 A.2d 918 (1960); 
Mello v. Local 4408, C.I.O. United Steelworkers, 82 R.I. 60, 105 A.2d 806 (1954); United 
States v. Voges, 124 F. Supp. 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). If the union requests arbitration, the 
right of the individual to participate in, the arbitration, proceedings is uncertain. Compare 
Clark v. Hein-Werner, supra note 86, with In the Matter of Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 
855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960) and Bailer v. Local 470, Int'l Teamsters, supra note 86. 
92. This approach has been explored much more fully by the author in Individual 
Rights in the Collective Agreement and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362 (1962). 
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Labor Relations Act for guides in defining the relative rights of the individual 
and the union.93 This focuses attention on Section 9(a) which grants and limits 
the authority of the majority union as statutory representative. This section 
provides that the majority union: 
shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for 
the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, 
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That 
any individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any 
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances 
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long 
as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of the collective-bar- 
gaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the 
bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such 
adjustment.94 
The words of the statute, reinforced by its legislative history, lead to the fol- 
lowing conclusions: First, the statutory status of the union in negotiating an 
agreement is different from its statutory status in settling grievances. The union 
has plenary power to make an agreement but not to settle grievances. Second, 
the individual has a statutory right to have his grievance adjusted without in- 
tervention of the bargaining agent which would bar him from asserting his claim 
or obtaining an adjustment. Third, the union can not by use of its statutory 
power to make an agreement, encroach on the individual's statutory right to 
have his grievance adjusted. A provision in the collective agreement giving the 
union exclusive control over grievances would be contrary to the statute and 
unenforceable. These conclusions parallel the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley,95 which arose under the Railway Labor Act, 
and held that the union could not make a binding settlement of an employee's 
grievance without his authorization or consent. 
This approach has not been elaborated by the courts, but the statute suggests 
further guides. The union has a right to be present at the adjustment of the 
grievance and insist that the adjustment conform to the collective agreement. 
Neither the union nor the individual has the power to make a settlement bind- 
ing on the other, and if they and the employer can not agree, the dispute must 
be adjudicated either by arbitration or in the court. 
The statutory approach builds upon the distinction between contract making 
and contract administration, between the establishment of general rules and 
their application to particular cases. This does not assume that the collective 
agreement is clear or complete, or that bargaining ends with the signing of the 
agreement. All it assumes is that in resolving ambiguities and filling gaps in the 
93. Rights under the collective agreement are now governed exclusively by federal 
law. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Federal substantive 
Jaw must be applied whether suit is brought in the federal or state courts. Local 174, Int'l 
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). 
94. Labor Management Relations Act ? 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. ? 159(a) 
(1958). 
95. 325 U.S. 711 (1945). 
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agreement the parties intend to follow the guideposts of the agreements, and 
that in settling grievances they will not ignore the agreement. All that this ap- 
proach requires is that the individual who has a claim shall have access to a 
neutral arbiter and an opportunity to demonstrate that the collective parties 
have exceeded the limits of their general rules. The collective parties remain 
free to change the rules by negotiating a new agreement or formally amending 
the old, but they can not set aside general rules in particular cases through the 
grievance procedure. 
THE SWEDISH SOLUTION 
In 1910 proposals were made in the Swedish parliament for legislation con- 
cerning employment contracts and collective agreements, and for creation of a 
Labor Court." These proposals, which laid the foundation for later legislation, 
put to the side theoretical conceptions of the collective agreement, and instead 
sought to fit the law to the needs and purposes of the collective agreement.97 
In the studies and the debates, one of the recurrent problems was defining the 
relative rights of the individual and the organization.98 
One of the central premises of the proposal was that the individual employee 
obtained rights under the collective agreement and could independently enforce 
those rights. To the argument that only the collective parties should be allowed 
to sue in the Labor Court it was replied that this would mean that the individ- 
ual would be hindered in enforcing his rights because of his organization's re- 
fusal to cooperate. This, it was emphatically declared, would be clearly unrea- 
sonable, for the organization might refuse to enforce valid claims for reasons 
other than their merit. To force the individual to sue in the general courts on 
his employment contract would deprive him of the court with special qualifica- 
tions to decide these matters and might lead to conflicting results.99 
The original proposal gave the individual almost complete independence in 
enforcing his rights. When his rights were violated, he could sue. If the organi- 
zation brought suit, he could bar it from litigating his portion of the claim or 
collecting damages on his behalf.100 This was criticized because the employer, 
especially in lockout cases, might be subjected to multiple suits and the courts 
would be overburdened.l1l The whole proposal was ultimately defeated by a 
legislative impasse, but for reasons unrelated to this provision.102 Revised ver- 
sions were also proposed in 1911 103 and 1916,10 but likewise failed. 
96. KUNGL, MAJ :TS PROPOSITION No. 96 (1910). 
97. See generally ADLERCREUTZ, KOLLEKTIVAVTALET 462-64 (1954). 
98. See AKERMAN & OLIN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 108-11. 
99. See KUNGL, MAJ :TS PROPOSITION No. 96, 77 (1910). 
100. Section 11, id. at 74. 
101. Id. at 148-49. 
102. For the political debate around this legislation and the reasons for its passage by 
one chamber of the parliament and its defeat by the other, see WESTERSTAHL, SVENSK 
FACKF6RENINGSR6RELSEN 312-26 (1945). 
103. KUNGL, MAJ:TS PROPOSITION No. 43 (1911). 
104. K. SOCIALSTYRELSEN, UNDERDANIGT UTLATANDE MED F6RSLAG TIL LAG OM VISSA 
ATGARDER TILL FRAMMANDE AV ARBETSFRED (1916). 
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The proposals of 1910 finally bore fruit in 1928 in the Collective Contracts 
Act and the Labor Court Act. Again the problem of defining the rights of the 
individual under the collective agreement were studied and debated. The 
premises which underlay the earlier proposals were fully accepted; discussion 
centered on fitting these to the practical needs of the parties. The committee of 
experts proposed that the organization be empowered to sue on behalf of their 
members if the members themselves did not sue.105 Again, giving the union sole 
power to enforce was emphatically rejected. "An individual member of an or- 
ganization would in this way become wholly thrown upon the organization's 
discretion."'106 The original proposal was modified, for it was recognized that 
in allowing an individual alone to litigate the validity or contents of the agree- 
ment, he might by defective handling create a dangerous precedent. But it was 
still emphasized that "one can not deprive him of all possibility in this regard 
if the organization will not help him."107 
The relative rights of the individual and the organization to enforce the col- 
lective agreement are set forth in Section 13 of the Labor Court Act which 
provides: 
An association which has concluded a collective contract may bring an 
action in the Labor Court on behalf of any person who is or has been a 
member of the association; and a member of the association shall not him- 
self bring an action unless he proves that the association refuses to take 
action in his behalf. 
This section is built upon the basic premise that both the individual and the 
organization have rights under provisions of the collective agreement which 
directly benefit the individual. The major elements of the section are clear. 
First, the organization can sue to enforce the agreement, not only to protect its 
collective interest but to assert rights of individuals bound by the agreement. 
Second, the organization is not only a proper party to enforce individual rights, 
but shall have the first opportunity to do so, for the individual can sue only if 
the organization refuses to take action on his behalf. Third, the individual has 
an indestructible right to have enforced the provisions of the agreement made 
for his benefit, for his claim is neither settled nor barred by the organization's 
refusal to seek enforcement. Fourth, the individual's claims, whether asserted 
by the organization or the individual, are adjudicated in the Labor Court, the 
tribunal specially created and specially competent for resolving disputes arising 
tinder collective agreements. 
It is immediately apparent that these major elements of the Swedish law 
drawn from Section 13 bear a marked similarity to the essential elements of 
the American statutory approach drawn from Section 9 of the NLRA. Study 
of the Swedish law and experience under Section 13 may be particularly valu- 
105. KUNGL, MAJ :TS PROPOSITION o. 39 (1928), Sakkunnigas Utkast, Section 13. 
106. Id. at 191. 
107. Id. at 192. The proposal was modified to make completely clear that the union 
could not defeat the individual's claim either by failing to take action or by starting a suit 
and then withdrawing it. Id. at 244. 
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able in developing our own statutory approach and separating real from 
imaginary problems. 
The Scope of Individual Rights 
The central thrust of the Swedish statutory provision is that the individual 
has rights under the collective agreement which his organization can neither 
bar nor barter away. The breadth of that thrust is forcefully illustrated by three 
cases. An employer, in making promotions, consulted the union and reached 
an agreement with it on who should be promoted. When an employee who had 
been passed over protested that under the terms of the contract he was entitled 
to promotion, the employer defended on the grounds of his agreement with the 
union. The employee then brought suit in the Labor Court. The court held that 
although the union was bound by its settlement, the individual's right to pro- 
motion must be governed by the provisions of the collective contract and not 
by the union's consent. The court found that the employee met the require- 
ments of the contract and ordered him promoted.108 In another case the col- 
lective agreement provided that either of the collective parties could demand 
arbitration.109 An employee claimed that he had been underpaid during a period 
of six years, but the union disagreed and refused to demand arbitration. When 
the employee brought suit in the Labor Court, the employer argued that the 
court had no jurisdiction because the collective agreement required disputes as 
to the meaning to be submitted to arbitration. The court curtly rejected this 
argument, holding that because the agreement contained no provision corre- 
sponding to Section 13 of the Labor Court Act but allowed only the collective 
parties to demand arbitration, the individual could assert his claim in the Labor 
Court.110 The third case makes clear that Section 13 also protects an individual, 
here an employer, from having his rights altered by his organization waiving 
any provisions. The union claimed that an individual employer had made im- 
proper deductions from wages due a group of workers. When local negotiations 
failed, the dispute was referred to the national union and employers association, 
but they were unable to settle. The contract provided that suit must be brought 
within two months after negotiations were terminated. After fifty days had 
passed, the union was given an extension of time by the employers association 
without any notice to or consent by the individual employer. When the union 
later brought suit the employer set up the defense that the suit had not been 
brought within the prescribed time. The Labor Court held that the individual 
employer had a right under the agreement that suits be brought within the 
prescribed time, and the association could not under Section 13 of the Labor 
Court Act surrender this right without his consent. The fact that the organiza- 
tion negotiated on his behalf gave it no authority to surrender his rights, nor is 
108. AD 1946:31. 
109. Section 11 of the Labor Court Act provides that "A dispute which would other- 
wise be heard in the Labor Court may instead be referred by agreement to arbitration for 
decision. ..." 
110. AD 1945:27. 
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he legally obligated "to submit to a disposition which he believes violates his 
rights under the collective agreement.""' 
The primary concern here is how this very substantial protection of individ- 
ual rights has functioned, what problems it has confronted in accommodating 
collective and individual rights, and what rules or guides have been developed 
in working out that accommodation. A total of forty-five cases have been brought 
to the Labor Court by individual employees under Section 13, and in nine of 
these the individual has won. The kinds of cases brought vary widely. Nineteen 
involved wage claims, including piece rates, overtime, vacation pay, sick pay 
and expense allowances; eighteen involved discharges; four involved job pri- 
ority claims such as lay-off, recall or replacement; three were promotion cases; 
and one was a demand for a favorable letter of reference. 
Availability of Individual Suits-The Number and Types of Cases 
In both 1910 and 1928 when Section 13 was discussed, fears had been ex- 
pressed that allowing individuals to sue would bring a flood of cases to the 
Labor Court. These fears have proven unfounded. The largest number of cases 
in any one year was six in 1953, and in each of the last two decades there has 
been an average of less than two a year. Even success does not incite others to 
bring such cases. In 1946 individuals bringing suit won three out of four cases, 
but the next three years produced only three cases; and in 1958, nine individuals 
won a noted victory in the Stockholm Bachelor Hotel Case,"2 but no individ- 
ual cases were brought the following year. Nor is the small number of individ- 
ual cases due to the collective parties' avoiding their responsibility to settle 
cases, and carrying a multitude of worthless or trivial cases to adjudication. 
In recent years less than fifty cases a year are carried to the Labor Court under 
collective agreements covering more than two million workers; other griev- 
ances are settled by negotiation. 
Individual cases are probably deterred in part by the costs of litigation. If 
the individual wins, the court will award him legal costs, including attorney's 
fees, but if he loses, the court can and often does tax him with the legal costs. 
These may range from 200 to 2,000 crowns, or the equivalent of from a week 
to two months income. The availability of legal aid funds prevents legal costs 
from being any bar to an individual enforcing his rights, but he is deterred 
from litigating worthless claims by the fact that he must ultimately pay these 
costs according to his ability. The small number of individual cases is probably 
due more to the confidence which the individual has in his organization and 
his willingness to accept its decision as fair. 
111. AD 1947:13. In this and other cases the Labor Court has not diluted the individ- 
ual's right by finding that he has authorized the organization to act in his behalf. Although 
such authority might be explicitly given, the Labor Court has refused to find any implied 
authority in the fact that he permitted the organization to negotiate concerning the griev- 
ance, or that the union had tried to further his interests. Nor has the Labor Court been 
willing to find any general authorization in the union's constitution. AD 1958:23. 
112. AD 1958:23. 
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Reasons For The Union's Refusal to Sue 
Under Section 13, the individual can sue only if his organization refuses to 
do so. Some understanding of the functioning of this provision is added by in- 
quiring into the reasons why the union has refused to proceed in these cases.113 
In a few, the individual's claim appears to have no support in the collective 
agreement and seems clearly worthless.14 However, in the majority of cases 
the individual's claim appears to be at least arguable and often the arguments 
either for or against the claim seem nearly evenly balanced. In a few cases, like 
the promotion case described earlier,"" the union has either agreed with the 
employer in advance to the very conduct which the individual claims is contrary 
to the contract 116 or has worked out a compromise solution which gives the 
individual only part of what he claims."7 The union has thereby foreclosed 
itself from proceeding on a claim which it might otherwise deem meritorious. 
In the typical case the claim is doubtful and the union, after full consideration, 
has decided that in its judgment the claim lacks sufficient merit to be worth 
processing and has either settled the case or refused to proceed. The individual 
sues because he disagrees with the union's judgment as to the merits of the 
case. 
The union's refusal to proceed may evidence a lack of aggressiveness in pro- 
tecting the employee's interest. This may lead it to surrender cases which could 
be won. In one case, a warehouse employee arranged to buy a bicycle which 
had been used as a display model in the showroom. Instead of obtaining a pur- 
chase order, paying the cashier and then surrendering his receipt in return for 
the bicycle, he simply paid the money direct to the salesman who said he would 
make up the papers and hand the money to the cashier. The salesman, however, 
kept the money. When this was discovered the purchasing employee was dis- 
charged for his failure to follow the prescribed procedures and making possible 
the loss. The union, after discussing the case with the employer, agreed that 
the discharge was justified. The Labor Court, however, in the individual's suit, 
found otherwise. The employee had indeed violated the rules, but he had no 
reason to suspect the salesman and had acted in good faith under mitigating 
circumstances which made the discharge unjustified.118 The union may also 
surrender valid claims because it is too willing to accept the employer's version 
of the facts. For example, a seaman claimed that his termination with only 
113. The reasons for the union's refusal to proceed often does not appear in the report 
of the case. The files in the Labor Court which include all of the documents in the cases 
have been examined to determine so far as possible the union's reasons for refusal to pro- 
ceed. 
114. The individual's interpretation of the agreement may be clearly erroneous, see 
AD 1952:20; AD 1947:79; AD 1944:60; AD 1940:16; or his version of the facts not sup- 
ported by the evidence, see AD 1960:5; AD 1960 :2; AD 1953:56; AD 1953:22; AD 1945: 
61. 
115. Note 108 supra. 
116. See, e.g., AD 1958:23; AD 1953:19; AD 1944:41; AD 1932:168. 
117. See, e.g., AD 1952:7; AD 1944:57; AD 1933:112. 
118. AD 1949:19; cf. AD 1942:99. 
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seven days notice was improper. He admitted that because he was not fully 
qualified as a first machinist he could be replaced by a qualified person on such 
short notice, but claimed that the employer had not obtained such a replace- 
ment. The employer stated that a fully qualified first machinist had been hired 
before notice was given but that he later took another job. The union conceded 
the correctness of the employer's action, and the seaman was compelled to carry 
his own case to the Labor Court. There the alleged replacment was questioned 
for the first time. He testified that although he had been offered the position, 
he had not accepted. This evidence, which the union had apparently not at- 
tempted to obtain, was decisive in winning the case for the individual.119 
In none of the cases does it appear that the union's refusal to take the cases 
to the Labor Court was due to arbitrariness, favoritism or vindictiveness. How- 
ever, if the individual's predicament is a result of his own violation of the con- 
tract or union rules, the union may deny any responsibility. For example, a 
crew of building workers agreed to accept less than the contract scale if the 
employer would continue with the project. After it was completed, they claimed 
the full amount and the union refused to help them even though their claim 
was clearly valid. Their own violation of the contract and union rules had 
created their problem and the union felt no responsibility.120 The union may 
also deny responsibility for protecting those who are no longer members of the 
union even though they are still bound by the contract. Thus the union has 
refused to sue on behalf of those who are delinquent in dues,12' who are in bad 
standing 122 or who have seceded from the union.123 In four cases, however, the 
union's refusal to proceed has no apparent explanation other than indifference 
to the member's rights.124 
Participation By The Collective Parties And The Individual 
The fact that the union refuses to take the case to the Labor Court does not 
preclude it from participating in the proceedings when an individual sues under 
Section 13. The court has recognized that the decision in an individual's case 
may affect collective interests, and has allowed or even requested the union to 
present its views. This is particularly important in questions of interpreta- 
tion.125 Usually the union simply states that it agrees with the employer's in- 
terpretation, but it may give more specific support by testifying to the history 
119. AD 1956:38. See AD 1954:7, where the union refused to process a member's 
claim for a sick pension because he had earlier refused to take a physical examination, 
although four doctors had separately certified that he was disabled by mental illness. See 
also AD 1958:26, discussed note 137 infra. 
120. AD 1932:68. Where the union feels that the individual has been the victim of 
overreaching by the employer, it will come to his aid. See AD 1932:55. 
121. AD 1960:26; AD 1951 :17; AD 1945 :27. 
122. AD 1961 :13; AD 1941:149. 
123. AD 1946:63; cf. AD 1932:33. 
124. AD 1956:41; AD 1946:69; AD 1946:70; AD 1941 :155. Examination of the Labor 
Court files in these cases leaves the unions refusal to proceed all the more difficult to ex- 
plain. 
125. See, e.g., AD 1956:38; AD 1953:2; AD 1941:149; AD 1940:16. 
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of the provision and the reason for its inclusion,126 to the intention of the col- 
lective parties when they adopted the provision,127 or to the practices of the 
parties under the provision.128 Where the union has agreed in advance to the 
employer's conduct, the union may for practical purposes be a codefendant in 
the case and oppose the individual's claim with as much vigor as the em- 
ployer.129 
In permitting the union to participate, the court seeks to protect two in- 
terests. First, it seeks to protect the union's collective interest in the agreement. 
Before adopting the employer's interpretation in a case which may establish 
a precedent, the court needs to know whether the union agrees or has refused 
to proceed for some other reason.130 The union may agree in the particular case 
but may want to avoid too broad a precedent. For example, a collective agree- 
ment provided that employees could be discharged without notice for "miscon- 
duct of more gross nature" and further provided that " [a] s misconduct of more 
gross nature should be considered dishonesty and intoxication on the job." The 
employee was discharged for working on another job while receiving sick pay. 
The union conceded that under the circumstances this could be considered dis- 
honesty and grounds for discharge, but opposed the employer's broader con- 
tention that discharge could be for offenses other than the two listed, dishonesty 
and intoxication.'3' Second, the court seeks to protect its own interest in mak- 
ing an informed judgment. Thus, the union may give its version of the facts 
even though it has no collective interest in the particular case, and in cases in- 
volving complicated piece-work rates in construction the court may seek the 
expert opinion of union officials.'32 The guiding principle in the proceeding is 
to permit participation by all who may have an interest or who may aid in de- 
veloping the facts. For example, in a suit brought by an individual against his 
employer, not only the union but the national employers association was allowed 
to participate, even though the employer was not a member.133 The contract 
had incorporated by reference the national agreement and the court was re- 
quired to interpret that agreement. The case thus involved four parties, each 
representing independent interests and views. 
The court has never confronted directly the other half of the problem of the 
right of participation-the right of the individual to participate in suits brought 
by the union to enforce his rights under the collective agreement. It would 
126. See, e.g., AD 1961 :9. 
127. See, e.g., AD 1953:56. 
128. See, e.g., AD 1950:54. 
129. See, e.g., AD 1958:23; AD 1953:19; AD 1946:31. 
130. In AD 1956:41, when the union was requested to state its position it supported 
the individual's interpretation of the contract, and in AD 1958:23, Part I, the union did not 
oppose the individuals' claim but instead stated that it had refused to proceed because the 
employer had agreed to follow the rules which the individuals sought to have the court 
declare. Cf. text accompanying note 151 infra. 
131. AD 1950:54. 
132. See, e.g., AD 1960:10. 
133. AD 1956:41. 
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seem, however, that he would be entitled to participate in such proceedings. If 
the union sues, the individual is barred by Section 13 of the Labor Court Act 
from bringing an independent suit, but the purpose of this is not to deny his 
rights under the agreement but to prevent multiple litigation.'34 The suit ad- 
judicates both collective and individual rights, and both interests are entitled 
to be fully represented. These interests may not always coincide. Indeed, when 
the dispute is one in which employees have prior rights to particular jobs, the 
union's position may be directly opposed to those of some members.135 Putting 
to the side the possibility that the collective parties might use the procedure as 
a sham to make a binding settlement of the individual's rights, the individual 
may want to present different arguments or evidence in support of his claim. 
There would seem no reason to depart from the court's guiding principles of 
allowing all to participate who have substantial interests to protect or who may 
aid the court in making a fully informed judgment. 
The importance of full participation, and the court's willingness to provide 
it, is illustrated by a case in which an employer had deducted from the wages 
of six carpenters damages for their alleged breach of the collective agreement. 
The union brought suit in the Labor Court admitting the breach of contract, 
but contesting the employer's right to deduct damages from wages due. The 
carpenters, insisting that they had not breached the agreement, sued in the 
general courts for their wages. This was referred to the Labor Court, which 
ordered it consolidated with the union's suit.136 At the hearing both the in- 
dividuals and the union participated. During the course of the hearing the union 
changed its position, claiming that the employer had not informed it of all the 
relevant facts, and supported the individuals' contention that they had not acted 
in breach of contract.'37 This contention, which was upheld by the court, might 
never have been explored but for the participation of the individuals whose 
views and interests differed from those of the union. 
Interpretation of The Agreement And Continued Bargaining 
The most difficult problem in accommodating the relative rights of the in- 
dividual and the union grows out of the inherent ambiguity of the collective 
agreement and the continuing need of the parties to give it meaning case by 
case. This poses the problem: to what extent is the individual bound by the 
interpretation of the collective parties? If the collective parties have unlimited 
freedom to interpret, then the individual's rights are wholly subservient; if the 
collective parties have no freedom to interpret they are bound in a strait-jacket. 
The Labor Court and Swedish writers have struggled with these problems and 
developed some helpful guides.138 
134. See KUNGL, MAJ :TS PROPOSITION No. 96, 74, 148 (1910); PROPOSITION No. 39, 
180, 244 (1928). 
135. See, e.g., AD 1946:61. 
136. AD 1958:2. 
137. AD 1958:26. 
138. See SCHMIDT, THE LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 81-91 (1962). 
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The Labor Court has stated two basic principles which place outer limits on 
the power of the collective parties to bind the individual by their interpretation. 
First, they can not by their interpretation change the collective agreement.139 
The individual has rights under the agreement and these can no more be de- 
stroyed or surrendered under the guise of interpretation than any other way.140 
If at the time the contract was made, the parties had a clear intent as to its 
meaning, whether its words were clear or not, the parties can not later agree 
that the contract shall have a different meaning. This principle does not bind 
tightly, for when the words are unclear the parties can testify to their original 
intent, and even seemingly plain words may prove ambiguous.14' Second, the 
collective parties can not mislead those bound by the agreement as to their rights 
and obligations. If the original intent of the collective parties conflicts with the 
clear words of the contract, the individual's rights are governed by the words 
of the contract until he is informed of the original intent.142 His expectations 
can not be defeated by the secret intent of the parties. This principle, like the 
first, does not bind tightly, for the words must be completely clear. Any un- 
certainty as to the meaning or application of the contract prevents the individ- 
ual from claiming any fixed expectations or firm reliance.143 
These principles, although they fix boundaries, do not solve the difficult cases 
for they apply only where the intent of the parties or the words of the contract 
are clear. But in many cases neither the intent nor the words are clear. The 
parties may have failed to foresee the problem or, having foreseen it, postponed 
solving it by keeping silent or being deliberately ambiguous. The collective 
agreement is, by its nature, incomplete and must be filled out by the parties in 
their day-to-day settlement of disputes. Interpretation becomes a process of 
completion; it does not discover terms in the contract but adds terms to the con- 
tract. In principle, Section 13 creates no obstacle to this process of completing 
the contract. The individual has rights in terms agreed upon by the parties, but 
he has no rights in terms left unsettled.'44 The parties retain their freedom to 
continue their contract making. 
The Labor Court has recognized this special character of the collective con- 
tract and has not attempted to dissect its words or search the minds of the 
parties in order to discover agreement which was never there.145 The court has 
139. AD 1947:13; AD 1946:31. 
140. The fact that the union knows of a long continued practice and made no objection 
can not work a change of the agreement. AD 1958:23. 
141. See, e.g., AD 1932:168. 
142. AD 1944:4. 
143. AD 1953:19; AD 1941:154. 
144. Thus the parties may, by their agreement, expressly provide that certain matters 
such as job transfers and upgrading shall be agreed upon by the parties from time to time 
and the member is subject to these determinations. AD 1950:65; AD 1941 :29. If the parties 
reserved by express provision a blanket power to agree on any interpretation, whatsoever 
for any term of the collective agreement, the rights of the individual would be undercut. 
Such a provision probably would' be void as contrary to the purpose of Section 13. 
145. See Schmidt, Kollektivarbetsritt 1949-57, Sv. J.T. 217 (1958). 
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left the process of completion to the parties and given them a wide range of 
freedom in filling out the terms of the agreement. This freedom to complete, 
however, is not unconfined, for it is restricted by two other limiting rules. First, 
the parties' interpretation must follow the general guides of the agreement; 
gaps are to be filled, not the contract remade. Although the court often says 
that a member is bound by his organization's interpretation, close examination 
of the cases indicates that the court does not blindly accept the organization's 
interpretation. Instead, the court carefully scrutinizes that interpretation to 
determine whether it is reasonable in the light of the settled terms of the agree- 
ment.146 Second, the interpretation must be consistently applied; the meaning 
of the contract can not be changed from case to case.147 If the parties have in- 
terpreted a provision in one case, they are bound by that interpretation in sub- 
sequent cases.148 In effect, the parties may fill the gaps and complete the con- 
tract by establishing general rules, but they can not then set aside those rules 
in particular cases any more than they could set aside other contract terms. In- 
deed, this principle that disputes arising under a collective agreement are to 
be decided according to general rules and not according to the unchannelled 
discretion of the collective parties expresses the purposes at the heart of Section 
13 and adds life and color to the other limits on the collective parties' freedom 
to interpret the contract. 
The collective parties are not irretrievably bound by their agreement, for 
they are free at any time to amend the agreement or negotiate a new one.149 
Section 13 was never intended to compel the parties to continue an unsatisfac- 
tory contract until its termination date; it was only intended to secure the in- 
dividual's rights until the contract had been changed by regular procedures.150 
Thus, Section 13 assumes a working distinction between contract making and 
contract administration. Although the functions of these two processes overlap, 
for the contract is completed by grievance settlement, the two processes are in 
practice procedurally distinct. The procedures used by unions and employers 
associations to make and amend collective agreements are markedly different 
from those used for settling disputes arising under the agreement. The power 
to make contracts is not normally placed in the same hands as the power to 
settle grievances, for both the organizations and their members consider these 
functions to be of a significantly different order. Section 13, built upon this 
practical and functional distinction, prescribes that an individual's rights under 
the agreement be changed only by the procedures established for making and 
amending contracts. 
146. See, e.g., AD 1961:9; AD 1958:23; AD 1957:34; AD 1953:56; AD 1947:66; 
AD 1941 :149; AD 1940:16. 
147. AD 1953:19. 
148. AD 1932:168. 
149. Under ? 1 of the Collective Contracts Act, collective agreements must be in writ- 
ing. Any modification of the contract must also be in, writing. AD 1958:23; AD 1945 :10. 
150. AD 1949:39. 
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Even the freedom to amend the collective agreement, however, may be limited 
if the amendment affects the rights of some individuals retroactively. In the 
Stockholm Bachelors Hotel Case, several desk clerks in these hotels had over a 
long period worked extra hours and received no overtime pay as required by 
the contract. They protested and this practice was ultimately corrected, but there 
remained the claim of back pay for more than a year. After several months of 
discussion, the union and employers' association made a compromise settle- 
ment. On the same day they signed a new collective contract which incorporated 
by reference the settlement agreement. The desk clerks rejected this compromise 
and sued for the remainder of the back pay. The Labor Court held that even 
though the settlement was made in connection with a new collective contract, 
the union could not surrender a claim which was "already earned" without the 
members' authority or consent.151 The claim here was for back pay for work per- 
formed, and the court gave no clue whether other "acquired rights" would be 
equally protected against changes by a new contract, nor what might be classi- 
fied as "acquired rights." Swedish writers have discussed this problem but have 
reached no consensus as to rationale or results.'52 
The Individual and Time Limits in The Contract 
One of the potential stumbling blocks for an individual in enforcing his 
rights is the time limit for bringing his suit. Most collective agreements provide 
that if the parties are unable to settle a dispute at the final step of the proce- 
dure, appeal to the Labor Court must be taken within a certain time limit after 
negotiations are concluded-commonly 60 days or three months. The court 
has held that this time is binding on the individual as well as the union. The 
individual faces two difficulties. First, he may not know within the limited time 
whether or not the union will carry his case to the court. In one case the in- 
dividual called the union the day before the time expired and was told that the 
union would probably do nothing, but the union made no decision for ten days 
and delayed three months before giving the individual notice of its decision. 
The individual thereupon began suit, but the court held that he was barred for 
failure to bring suit within the prescribed time.'53 This does not mean that the 
union by its delay can destroy the individual's claim, for all the individual needs 
to show to sue in his own behalf is that the union has failed to bring suit.154 
Thus, it was enough for him to show that the union had said that it had not 
151. AD 1958:23. 
152. See BERGSTR6M, op. cit. supra note 7, at 82-91; FAGERHOLM, ARBETSMARKNADS- 
JURIDIK, SVENSK TIDSKRIFT 291 (1948); SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 7, at 90-91. Much 
of the discussion has focused on the power of an employer's association to make a collec- 
tive agreement bind on a member employer retroactively to the termination date of the 
prior agreement. It has not focused on the surrender of the specific claims of a few arising 
under a preceding contract as a part of the making of a new contract such as was involved 
here. 
153. AD 1944:20. 
154. AD 1947:38. 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 14 Mar 2013 09:04:18 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
452 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.72:421 
decided to sue, nor decided not to sue, nor decided when it would decide.155 
But the burden is put on the individual to determine what the union has done 
and, if it fails to act, to take the initiative of bringing suit within the time limits 
himself. The second difficulty for the individual is that he may not know when 
negotiations are concluded and the limitation time thereby started running. 
It is clear from the cases that he is not entitled to formal notice; actual knowl- 
edge will be enough.'56 The court has never confronted a case in which the 
individual did not have actual knowledge, but it would seem that the collective 
parties could not by their hidden act destroy his rights.'57 Negotiations at the 
last step are usually at the national level, and may be protracted or delayed. 
To require the individual, in order to protect his rights, to make repeated in- 
quiries of the parties as to the negotiations in the case not only puts an undue 
burden on the individual but invites harassment of the parties. The cases show 
that the Labor Court has in fact been relatively liberal in enforcing the time 
limits against individuals,'58 and in those cases in which the individual has been 
barred, the delay has been due to his own neglect.'59 
The Non-Union Individual 
The individual employee who is not a member of the union has a greater 
measure of independence than a union member in enforcing rights growing out 
of the employment relation. According to Swedish theory his rights rest not on 
the collective agreement but on his individual contract of employment. Enforce- 
ment of this is completely within his control. However, he must enforce these 
rights in the general courts, for the Labor Court can enforce only rights under 
collective agreements. The non-union individual, therefore, is relegated to the 
general courts whose procedure is more cumbersome and who lack the special 
competence of the Labor Court. He is thereby deprived of those very advan- 
tages which were specially sought when the Labor Court was created. These 
suits in the general courts also raise problems for the collective parties. Be- 
cause the individual contract of employment normally incorporates the terms 
of the collective agreement, the general courts must in fact interpret the collec- 
tive agreement, and in a proceeding in which the union is not a party. This 
anomaly serves neither the interests of the individual nor the interests of the 
155. AD 1932:68. 
156. See AD 1951:17; AD 1944:57. 
157. When the Labour Court Act was proposed in 1928, ? 13 provided that an individ- 
ual could sue only if he showed that the union had decided, not to bring suit. It was pointed 
out that the individual might lose his claim in two ways: (1) the union avoided suing 
without making any decision and (2) if the union} began the suit and later dropped it. The 
section was changed to meet both of these objections by requiring the member to show only 
that the union failed to take action in his behalf. KUNGL, MAJ :TS PROPOSITION No. 39, 244 
(1928). 
158. See AD 1952:10. 
159. See AD 1944:57 (suit six months after notified by union that it would not take 
case to Labour Court); AD 1953:6 (suit seven months after told that union would not 
appeal); AD 1954:28 (suit more than year after union decided not to appeal). 
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collective parties but invites the very lack of uniformity within the collective 
bargaining system which the Labor Court has sought to avoid.'60 
Evaluation of the Swedish Solution 
Study of the cases coming before the Labor Court provides only a limited 
basis for evaluating the practical operation of the Swedish solution. However, 
after nearly thirty-five years of experience with Section 13 certain conclusions 
are reasonably clear. 
First, the dangers foreseen by those who opposed giving the individual any 
right to sue have proven unreal. The Labor Court has not been flooded with 
individual suits; such suits have constituted less than two percent of all cases 
coming before the court. Nor has Section 13 led the union to processing worth- 
less claims lest the individual discredit the union leaders by appealing his case 
and winning. Although the number of individual suits has tended to increase 
somewhat in later years, the number of all cases taken to the Labor Court has 
decreased from over 200 a year in 1932 to less than 40 in each of the last five 
years, while the coverage of collective agreements has tripled. The fears that 
the parties would be deprived of needed flexibility in administering the collec- 
tive agreement have not been realized. The contract can be completed by inter- 
pretation. The limits on interpretation developed by the Labor Court keep the 
collective parties within bounds but do not put them in a straight-jacket or 
immobilize them from working out their problems. 
Second, the individual is given a significant, though limited, measure of pro- 
tection. He is protected not only against the union's arbitrarily surrendering 
or trading his rights but also against the union's indifference or negligence. 
Section 13 has proven to have its greatest practical value where the union 
honestly fails to recognize the merits of the individual claim. The protection 
has limited reach, for the Labor Court gives substantial weight to the views 
of the collective parties both as to their interpretation of the agreement and 
their version of the facts. The individual who appeals from a settlement carries 
a heavy burden of demonstrating that the settlement was wrong. The individ- 
ual, however, does have an opportunity to present his case to the court and 
demonstrate its merit. The fact that this recourse is available to the individual 
may cause the parties to be more considerate of his rights and, by its mere 
presence, provide substantial protection. 
Third, there seems to be genuine acceptance by the collective parties that the 
individual should have independent rights under the collective agreements. 
Neither the employers associations nor the unions seem seriously disturbed by 
the idea that an individual member can challenge their collective decisions by 
such suits. They do not consider it a repudiation or a threat to their security 
160. Proposals to broaden the jurisdiction of the Labor Court to include suits on in- 
dividual contracts have been made from time to time. Studies are presently being made of 
the problems and possibilities of such a change. See ANDRA LAGUTSKOTTETS UTLATANDE 
No. 19 (1960). 
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but rather a part of the system of rights and duties. Four of the seven members 
of the Labor Court are representatives of the collective parties and they in- 
evitably bring to the court the viewpoints of the collective parties.'6' However, 
the judgments of the court in these cases seems quite objective. There is no 
evidence of special sensitivity to individual rights nor desire to extend their 
protection. But there is also no evidence of hostility to individual suits nor 
efforts to warp the facts or contractual provisions to defeat his claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Swedish legal theory an employee is bound by a collective agreement 
only if he consents by becoming a member of the union, but in the United 
States he is bound by the majority union's agreement even though he repudiates 
both the union and the agreement. Logically, it might be thought that a Swedish 
employee by joining the union consented to the union's settling of grievances 
arising under the agreement, but that an American employee bound against his 
will would have greater independence in enforcing his rights under the collec- 
tive agreement. Such has not been the case. Sweden early recognized the need 
to give the individual member rights independent of his union and has de- 
veloped a substantial body of law defining and protecting those rights, but in 
the United States the courts have frequently denied the individual any rights. 
Although Congress in amending the NLRA in 1947 sought to give increased 
recognition of the right of the individual to process his own grievance by elabo- 
rating the proviso of Section 9(a), state courts have almost uniformly ignored 
this provision. Many of them, relying on claimed practical needs of collective 
bargaining, have given complete control over individual rights to the collective 
parties. 
The Swedish law closely parallels the proviso to Section 9(a). Both are built 
upon the practical distinction between contract making and contract adminis- 
tration; both assume that the individual and the organization each have in- 
terests in enforcing the collective agreement; and both assert that the organi- 
zation can not surrender or compromise the rights of the individual without 
his consent. The central premise is that the collective agreement consists of a 
system of general rules governing terms and conditions of employment, and 
that all parties-collective and individual alike-are governed by those rules 
until they are changed by proper procedures. 
161. For a searching study of Labor Court decisions to determine how members rep- 
resenting the collective parties have reflected the interests of the parties in their opinions, 
see GEIJER & SCHMIDT, ARBETSGIVARE OCH FACKF6RENINGSLEDARE I. DOMARSXTTE (1958). 
When the interests of the collective parties are the same, they may combine to overrule the 
public members of the court. Id. at 87-111. However, this is exceptional, and the lay mem- 
bers of the court attempt to be as objective as possible. In 1941, when a union member of 
the court was criticized by union members for some of his decisions, he replied that he did 
not want to be on a Court if its members were to be "a sort of puppets who were expected 
to make up their minds on the questions at bar when, prompted by a telephone call from the 
niono" SCHMIDT, THE LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 43-44 (1962). 
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The fact that this solution has served in Sweden to give the individual sub- 
stantial protection without interfering with the needs and functioning of the 
collective bargaining system does not mean that it will work in the same way 
in this country. There are certain obvious differences which are particularly 
relevant. First, the range of interests which an individual has under a collective 
agreement is not the same in Sweden and in the United States. Seniority pro- 
visions are relatively rare in Sweden so that a union is seldom faced with the 
problem of deciding between two competing groups of employees. In addition, 
the Swedish collective agreement gives little protection against discharge other 
than to require notice of termination. This means that in both lay-off and dis- 
charge cases the individual's interest is greatly reduced, and his actual injury 
is further reduced by the prevailing conditions of full employment which enable 
him to find another job. A second significant difference between the Swedish 
and American context is the great amount of trust which Swedish workers 
repose in their union officers. This is largely a product of experience that they 
can be trusted. There is little fear that the officers will play favorites or use 
their power in a vindictive fashion. The traditional honesty, responsibility, and 
adherence to rule which union officers have shown increases the willingness of 
members to accept their decisions in grievance settlements. 
Because of these differences it is probable that if the law in this country 
afforded as clear a recognition of individual rights as does the law in Sweden, 
the number of cases would be relatively much greater. With greater interests at 
stake and less trust in union officers, individuals would be more ready to chal- 
lenge grievance settlements. At the same time, these very differences increase 
the need for giving the individual independent rights. The individual has at stake 
not merely a claim to back pay but his seniority rights; in settling his grievance 
the union is disposing of his future livelihood. Similarly, the lack of full confi- 
dence in the union officers-a fear not always unfounded in fact-multiplies the 
need for the individual to obtain review over their decisions. Seniority rules can 
be manipulated to favor some and eliminate others, and discharges of disliked 
individuals may not be vigorously contested. The availability of individual en- 
forcement curbs temptation to so misuse power and gives the distrustful in- 
dividual an opportunity to test the fairness of the settlement. If there were 
relatively more cases in this country than in Sweden, it would be largely be- 
cause the need to give the individual this right is greater. 
The Swedish experience suggests that the dangers in permitting individual 
enforcement can be easily overstated. The fact that collective agreements are 
incomplete and ambiguous does not prevent recognition of individual rights. 
Swedish collective agreements are written in at least as broad if not broader 
terms than American agreements. This is particularly true because national 
agreements for an entire industry must be applied to a multitude of shops 
throughout the country. The broad terms of the agreement must be filled out 
by day to day grievance negotiation as in this country. The collective parties 
have not found that their being confined within the bounds of their agreement 
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and general rules has deprived them of the flexibility needed to work out their 
problems. 
Perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from the Swedish experi- 
ence is that once we cast aside the sterile logic of legal theories and search for 
working solutions, the problems may prove less difficult than portrayed. It is 
easy to mistake existing practices for inescapable necessities, and to view estab- 
lished procedures as inherent in the structure. Looking at solutions to similar 
problems in another country might at least free us from such preconceptions. 
Collective bargaining, at its best, has been a pragmatic system capable of ad- 
justing to felt needs. The Swedish solution suggests that the protection of in- 
dividual rights within the framework of collective bargaining is not only pos- 
sible but can be achieved with no disruption of the essential process. 
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